[〈det code.n〉 malicious.a]
In the ICWSM 2009 Weblog Corpus:
A flaw with QuickTime could allow malicious code to be executed without the user knowing, say researchers.
(Parse)
(S1 (SINV (S (NP (NP (DT A) (NN flaw))
(PP (IN with)
(NP (NNP QuickTime))))
(VP (MD could)
(VP (VB allow)
(S (NP (JJ malicious) (NN code))
(VP (TO to)
(VP (VB be)
(VP (VBN executed)
(PP (IN without)
(S (NP (DT the) (NN user))
(VP (VBG knowing)))))
(, ,)
(VP (VBP say))
(NP (NNS researchers)) (. .)))
In the ICWSM 2009 Weblog Corpus:
By Adrian Covert Presenters at Black Hat revealed that most, if not all, of Windows Vista’s security features can be taken out with a single browser exploit, using Java and. NET to execute malicious code.
(Parse)
(S1 (S (PP (IN By)
(NP (NNP Adrian) (NNP Covert)))
(NP (NP (NNS Presenters))
(PP (IN at)
(NP (JJ Black) (NN Hat))))
(VP (VBD revealed)
(SBAR (IN that)
(S (NP (NP (NP (RBS most)) (, ,) (CONJP (IN if) (RB not))
(NP (DT all)) (, ,))
(PP (IN of)
(NP (NNS Windows))))
(NP (NP (NNP Vista) (POS 's)) (NN security) (NNS features))
(VP (MD can)
(VP (AUX be)
(VP (VBN taken) (PRT (RP out))
(PP (IN with)
(NP (DT a) (JJ single) (NN browser) (VB exploit)))
(, ,)
(S (VP (VBG using)
(NP (NNP Java) (CC and) (. .) (NN NET))
(S (VP (TO to)
(VP (VB execute)
(NP (JJ malicious) (NN code))))
(. .)))
In the ICWSM 2009 Weblog Corpus:
So, other then helping the occasional friend get rid of bots, worms, and popup cheese whiz, I am by no means an expert at malicious code.
(Parse)
(S1 (S (ADVP (RB So)) (, ,) (ADVP (JJ other)
(PP (IN then)
(S (VP (VBG helping)
(S (NP (DT the) (JJ occasional) (NN friend))
(VP (VB get)
(ADJP (JJ rid)
(PP (IN of)
(NP (NP (NNS bots)) (, ,)
(NP (NNS worms)) (, ,) (CC and)
(NP (JJ popup) (NN cheese) (NN whiz)))))
(, ,)
(NP (PRP I))
(VP (AUX am)
(PP (IN by)
(NP (NP (DT no) (NNS means))
(NP (NP (DT an) (NN expert))
(PP (IN at)
(NP (JJ malicious) (NN code))))
(. .)))
In the ICWSM 2009 Weblog Corpus:
You can be certain that nobody is installing any malicious code or ever viruses on the server that hosts your important website.
(Parse)
(S1 (S (NP (PRP You))
(VP (MD can)
(VP (AUX be)
(ADJP (JJ certain)
(SBAR (IN that)
(S (NP (NN nobody))
(VP (AUX is)
(VP (VBG installing)
(NP (NP (DT any) (JJ malicious) (NN code)) (CC or) (ADVP (RB ever))
(NP (NNS viruses)))
(PP (IN on)
(NP (NP (DT the) (NN server))
(SBAR (WHNP (WDT that))
(S (VP (VBZ hosts)
(NP (PRP$ your) (JJ important) (NN website)))))
(. .)))
In the ICWSM 2009 Weblog Corpus:
It can propagate itself over removable media and network drives and cause execution of malicious code via an autorun. inf file.
(Parse)
(S1 (S (NP (PRP It))
(VP (MD can)
(VP (VP (VB propagate)
(NP (PRP itself))
(PP (IN over)
(NP (JJ removable) (NNS media) (CC and) (NN network) (NNS drives))))
(CC and)
(VP (VB cause)
(NP (NP (NN execution))
(PP (IN of)
(NP (JJ malicious) (NN code))))
(PP (IN via)
(NP (DT an) (NNP autorun) (. .) (CD inf) (NN file)))
(. .)))
In the ICWSM 2009 Weblog Corpus:
The ability to remove malicious code is insurance against something slipping through Apple’s nets.
(Parse)
(S1 (S (NP (DT The) (NN ability)
(S (VP (TO to)
(VP (VB remove)
(NP (JJ malicious) (NN code)))
(VP (VBZ is)
(NP (NP (NN insurance))
(PP (IN against)
(NP (NP (NN something))
(VP (VBG slipping)
(PP (IN through)
(NP (NP (NNP Apple) (POS 's)) (NNS nets)))))
(. .)))
In the ICWSM 2009 Weblog Corpus:
Theme Authenticity Checker Scan all of your theme files for potentially malicious or unwanted code.
(Parse)
(S1 (S (NP (NN Theme) (NN Authenticity) (NNP Checker))
(VP (VB Scan)
(NP (NP (DT all))
(PP (IN of)
(NP (PRP$ your) (NN theme) (NNS files))))
(PP (IN for)
(NP (ADJP (RB potentially) (JJ malicious) (CC or) (JJ unwanted)) (NN code))))
(. .)))
In the ICWSM 2009 Weblog Corpus:
After learning the tools and techniques covered in the book’s earlier chapters, the final chapters of Malware Forensics: Investigating and Analyzing Malicious Code focus on using honeypots to collect malicious code in the wild and conducting technical profiling and threat assessment based upon malicious code analysis findings. * Authors have investigated and prosecuted federal malware cases, which allows them to provide unparalleled insight to the reader. * First book to detail how to perform? live forensic? techniques on malicous code. * Companion Web site provides working code for analysis. * In addition to the technical topics discussed, this book also offers critical legal considerations addressing the legal ramifications and requirements governing the subject matter this website
(Parse)
(S1 (S (PP (IN After)
(S (VP (VBG learning)
(NP (NP (DT the) (NNS tools) (CC and) (NNS techniques))
(VP (VBN covered)
(PP (IN in)
(NP (NP (NP (DT the) (NN book) (POS 's)) (JJR earlier) (NNS chapters)) (, ,)
(NP (NP (DT the) (JJ final) (NNS chapters))
(PP (IN of)
(NP (NNP Malware) (NNS Forensics))))
(: :)
(S (S (VP (VBG Investigating) (CC and) (VBG Analyzing)
(NP (JJ Malicious) (NNP Code) (NN focus))
(PP (IN on)
(S (VP (VBG using)
(NP (NNS honeypots))
(S (VP (TO to)
(VP (VB collect)
(NP (JJ malicious) (NN code))
(PP (IN in)
(NP (DT the) (JJ wild)
(S (CC and)
(S (S (S (VP (VBG conducting)
(NP (NP (JJ technical) (NN profiling) (CC and) (NN threat) (NN assessment))
(VP (VBN based)
(PP (IN upon)
(NP (JJ malicious) (NN code) (NN analysis) (NNS findings))))
(. .)
(NP (NNP *) (NNS Authors))
(VP (AUX have)
(VP (VBN investigated) (CC and) (VBN prosecuted)
(NP (NP (JJ federal) (JJ malware) (NNS cases)) (, ,)
(SBAR (WHNP (WDT which))
(S (VP (VBZ allows)
(S (NP (PRP them))
(VP (TO to)
(VP (VB provide)
(NP (JJ unparalleled) (NNP insight))
(PP (TO to)
(NP (DT the) (NN reader)))
(. .))
(NP (NNP *) (NNP First) (NN book))
(VP (TO to)
(VP (NN detail)
(SBAR (WHADVP (WRB how))
(S (VP (TO to)
(VP (VB perform))))
(. ?))
(VP (VB live)
(NP (ADJP (JJ forensic) (. ?)) (NNS techniques))
(PP (IN on)
(NP (NN malicous) (NN code)))
(. .)
(NP (NNP *) (NN Companion) (NNP Web) (NN site))
(VP (VBZ provides)
(NP (JJ working) (NN code))
(PP (IN for)
(NP (NN analysis)))))
(. .)))))
(NP (NNP *))
(PP (IN In)
(NP (NP (NN addition))
(PP (TO to)
(NP (NP (DT the) (JJ technical) (NNS topics))
(VP (VBN discussed)))
(, ,)
(NP (DT this) (NN book)) (ADVP (RB also))
(VP (VBZ offers)
(NP (JJ critical) (JJ legal) (NNS considerations))
(S (VP (VBG addressing)
(NP (NP (DT the) (JJ legal) (NNS ramifications) (CC and) (NNS requirements))
(VP (VBG governing)
(NP (DT the) (JJ subject) (NN matter))))
(NP (DT this) (NN website)))))))
In the ICWSM 2009 Weblog Corpus:
If you manage a Firebox with its default HTTP – Proxy, your users will not be able to download the malicious code needed to trigger some of these vulnerabilities.
(Parse)
(S1 (S (SBAR (IN If)
(S (NP (PRP you))
(VP (VBP manage)
(NP (DT a) (NN Firebox))
(PP (IN with)
(NP (NP (PRP$ its) (NN default) (NNS HTTP)) (: -) (JJ Proxy)))
(, ,)
(NP (PRP$ your) (NNS users))
(VP (MD will) (RB not)
(VP (AUX be)
(ADJP (JJ able)
(S (VP (TO to)
(VP (VB download)
(NP (NP (DT the) (JJ malicious) (NN code))
(VP (VBN needed)
(S (VP (TO to)
(VP (VB trigger)
(NP (NP (DT some))
(PP (IN of)
(NP (DT these) (NNS vulnerabilities)))
(. .)))
In the ICWSM 2009 Weblog Corpus:
However, it seems that there are certain AOL accounts that are passing themselves off as the identity of Chunkylover53, in order to deceive users and make them follow a link to infect their computers with a malicious code which is being distributed with the following message via the instant messaging program AIM: The malware has been detected as Bck / Turkojan. I, as it is a variant created with the Constructor / Turkojan mentioned previously in this blog.
(Parse)
(S1 (S (ADVP (RB However)) (, ,)
(NP (PRP it))
(VP (VBZ seems)
(SBAR (IN that)
(S (NP (EX there))
(VP (AUX are)
(NP (NP (JJ certain) (NN AOL) (NNS accounts))
(SBAR (WHNP (WDT that))
(S (VP (AUX are)
(VP (VBG passing)
(NP (PRP themselves)) (PRT (RP off))
(PP (IN as)
(NP (NP (DT the) (NN identity))
(PP (IN of)
(NP (NNP Chunkylover53)))))
(, ,)
(SBAR (IN in) (NN order)
(S (VP (TO to)
(VP (VP (VB deceive)
(NP (NNS users)))
(CC and)
(VP (VB make)
(S (NP (PRP them))
(VP (VB follow)
(NP (DT a) (NN link)
(S (VP (TO to)
(VP (VB infect)
(NP (PRP$ their) (NNS computers))
(PP (IN with)
(NP (NP (DT a) (JJ malicious) (NN code))
(SBAR (WHNP (WDT which))
(S (VP (AUX is)
(VP (AUXG being)
(VP (VBN distributed)
(PP (IN with)
(NP (NP (DT the) (JJ following) (NN message))
(PP (IN via)
(NP (DT the) (JJ instant) (NN messaging) (NN program) (NN AIM))))
(: :)
(S (NP (DT The) (NN malware))
(VP (AUX has)
(VP (AUX been)
(VP (VBN detected)
(PP (IN as)
(NP (NNP Bck) (NNP /) (NNP Turkojan))))
(. .))))
(NP (PRP I)) (, ,)
(SBAR (IN as)
(S (NP (PRP it))
(VP (AUX is)
(NP (NP (DT a) (NN variant))
(VP (VBN created)
(PP (IN with)
(NP (NP (DT the) (NNP Constructor) (NNP /) (NNP Turkojan))
(VP (VBN mentioned) (ADVP (RB previously))
(PP (IN in)
(NP (DT this) (NN blog)))
(. .)))
In Wikipedia:
A vector’ “in computing, specifically when talking about malicious code such as viruses or worms, is the” method “that this code uses to propagate itself or infect the computer and this sense is similar to, and derived from, its meaning in biology.
(Parse)
(S1 (S (NP (NP (DT A) (NN vector) (POS ')) ('' '')
(PP (IN in)
(NP (NN computing))))
(, ,)
(SBAR (ADVP (RB specifically)) (WHADVP (WRB when))
(S (VP (VBG talking)
(PP (IN about)
(NP (NP (JJ malicious) (NN code))
(PP (JJ such) (IN as)
(NP (NNS viruses) (CC or) (NNS worms)))))
(, ,)
(VP (AUX is)
(NP (NP (DT the) ('' '') (NN method)) ('' '')
(SBAR (WHNP (WDT that))
(S (S (NP (DT this) (NN code))
(VP (VBZ uses)
(S (VP (TO to)
(VP (VP (VB propagate)
(NP (PRP itself)))
(CC or)
(VP (VB infect)
(NP (DT the) (NN computer)))))
(CC and)
(S (NP (DT this) (NN sense))
(VP (VP (AUX is)
(ADJP (JJ similar)
(PP (TO to))))
(, ,) (CC and)
(VP (VBN derived)
(PP (IN from)))
(, ,)
(NP (NP (PRP$ its) (NN meaning))
(PP (IN in)
(NP (NN biology))))
(. .)))
In the ICWSM 2009 Weblog Corpus:
I’ve said before that Apple should not reject apps unless the code is malicious.
(Parse)
(S1 (S (NP (PRP I))
(VP (AUX 've)
(VP (VBN said) (ADVP (RB before))
(SBAR (IN that)
(S (NP (NNP Apple))
(VP (MD should) (RB not)
(VP (VB reject)
(NP (NNS apps))
(SBAR (IN unless)
(S (NP (DT the) (NN code))
(VP (AUX is)
(ADJP (JJ malicious)))))
(. .)))
In the ICWSM 2009 Weblog Corpus:
While there are more generally more updates provided with this type of solution (as it has to cater to all security releases and people using the system on their servers), there are often more security vulnerabilities as malicious code can be inserted more easily into the template or core files to cause conflicts with the database, leaving your blog corrupted and not displaying.
(Parse)
(S1 (S (SBAR (IN While)
(S (NP (EX there))
(VP (AUX are) (ADVP (RBR more) (RB generally))
(NP (NP (JJR more) (NNS updates))
(VP (VBN provided)
(PP (IN with)
(NP (NP (DT this) (NN type))
(PP (IN of)
(NP (NN solution)))
(PRN (-LRB- -LRB-)
(SBAR (IN as)
(S (NP (PRP it))
(VP (AUX has)
(S (VP (TO to)
(VP (VB cater)
(PP (TO to)
(NP (NP (DT all) (NN security) (NNS releases) (CC and) (NNS people))
(VP (VBG using)
(NP (NP (DT the) (NN system))
(PP (IN on)
(NP (PRP$ their) (NNS servers))))
(-RRB- -RRB-)))
(, ,)
(NP (EX there))
(VP (AUX are) (ADVP (RB often))
(NP (JJR more) (NN security) (NNS vulnerabilities))
(SBAR (IN as)
(S (NP (JJ malicious) (NN code))
(VP (MD can)
(VP (AUX be)
(VP (VBN inserted) (ADVP (RBR more) (RB easily))
(PP (IN into)
(NP (NP (DT the) (NN template)) (CC or)
(NP (NN core) (NNS files))))
(S (VP (TO to)
(VP (VB cause)
(NP (NP (NNS conflicts))
(PP (IN with)
(NP (DT the) (NN database))))
(, ,)
(S (VP (VP (VBG leaving)
(S (NP (PRP$ your) (NN blog))
(ADJP (JJ corrupted))))
(CC and)
(VP (RB not) (VBG displaying))))
(. .)))
In the ICWSM 2009 Weblog Corpus:
Again, there is discomfort when things don’t work the way we are accustomed to, but security is important and Vista is protecting us from what would definitely be greater discomfort with uncontrolled malicious code.
(Parse)
(S1 (S (ADVP (RB Again)) (, ,)
(NP (EX there))
(VP (AUX is)
(NP (NN discomfort))
(SBAR (WHADVP (WRB when))
(S (NP (NNS things))
(VP (AUX do) (RB n't)
(VP (VB work)
(NP (NP (DT the) (NN way))
(SBAR (S (S (NP (PRP we))
(VP (AUX are)
(VP (VBN accustomed)
(PP (TO to)))))
(, ,) (CC but)
(S (NP (NN security))
(VP (AUX is)
(ADJP (JJ important))))
(CC and)
(S (NP (NNP Vista))
(VP (AUX is)
(VP (VBG protecting)
(NP (PRP us))
(PP (IN from)
(SBAR (WHNP (WP what))
(S (VP (MD would) (ADVP (RB definitely))
(VP (AUX be)
(NP (NP (JJR greater) (NN discomfort))
(PP (IN with)
(NP (JJ uncontrolled) (JJ malicious) (NN code)))))
(. .)))
In the ICWSM 2009 Weblog Corpus:
Drive – by attacks Quote: this website Article / 34986 / A Google white paper analyzing web – based malware has reported that nearly a half – million URLs contain malicious code.
(Parse)
(S1 (S (NP (NP (NN Drive)) (: -)
(PP (IN by)
(NP (NNS attacks) (NN Quote)))
(: :)
(NP (NP (DT this) (JJ website) (NN Article))
(VP (VBG /)
(S (NP (CD 34986))
(VP (VBG /)
(NP (DT A) (NNP Google) (JJ white) (NN paper) (NN analyzing) (NN web)))
(: -)
(NP (VBN based) (NN malware)))
(VP (AUX has)
(VP (VBN reported)
(SBAR (IN that)
(S (NP (NP (RB nearly) (DT a) (NN half)) (: -)
(NP (CD million) (NNS URLs)))
(VP (VB contain)
(NP (JJ malicious) (NN code))))
(. .)))
In the ICWSM 2009 Weblog Corpus:
Office 2008 v12.1.2 contains’ ’ several changes to improve stability and performance’ ’ and includes’ ’ fixes that an attacker might use to overwrite the contents of a computer’s memory by using malicious code.”
(Parse)
(S1 (S (NP (NN Office) (CD 2008) (CD v12.1.2) (VBZ contains))
(VP (POS ') ('' ')
(NP (JJ several) (NNS changes)
(S (VP (TO to)
(VP (VB improve)
(NP (NN stability) (CC and) (NN performance)) ('' ') ('' ') (CC and)
(VP (VBZ includes)))
('' ') ('' ')
(NP (NNS fixes)
(SBAR (IN that)
(S (NP (DT an) (NN attacker))
(VP (MD might)
(VP (VB use)
(S (VP (TO to)
(VP (VB overwrite)
(NP (NP (DT the) (NNS contents))
(PP (IN of)
(NP (NP (DT a) (NN computer) (POS 's)) (NN memory))))
(PP (IN by)
(S (VP (VBG using)
(NP (JJ malicious) (NN code)))))
(. .) ('' ') ('' ')))
In the ICWSM 2009 Weblog Corpus:
My client had no clue and I know that not everyone has a trusted designer or tech support that they can email with problems such as these (plus speed is key, so waiting around for help can be frustrating), so I thought I’d write up a checklist of things you should do to remove malicious code from your hacked site and prevent it from happening again (or ever if it hasn’t happened yet).
(Parse)
(S1 (S (S (NP (PRP$ My) (NN client))
(VP (AUX had)
(NP (DT no) (NN clue))))
(CC and)
(S (NP (PRP I))
(VP (VBP know)
(SBAR (IN that)
(S (NP (RB not) (NN everyone))
(VP (AUX has)
(NP (DT a) (VBN trusted) (NN designer) (CC or) (NNP tech) (NN support)
(SBAR (IN that)
(S (NP (PRP they))
(VP (MD can)
(VP (NN email)
(PP (IN with)
(NP (NP (NNS problems))
(PP (JJ such) (IN as)
(NP (DT these)))
(PRN (-LRB- -LRB-) (CC plus)
(S (NP (NN speed))
(VP (AUX is)
(ADJP (JJ key)) (, ,) (ADVP (RB so))
(VP (VBG waiting) (ADVP (RB around))
(SBAR (IN for)
(S (NP (NN help))
(VP (MD can)
(VP (AUX be)
(ADJP (JJ frustrating)))
(-RRB- -RRB-))))
(, ,)
(SBAR (IN so)
(S (NP (PRP I))
(VP (VBD thought)
(SBAR (S (NP (PRP I))
(VP (MD 'd)
(VP (VB write) (PRT (RP up))
(NP (NP (DT a) (NN checklist))
(PP (IN of)
(NP (NP (NNS things))
(SBAR (S (NP (PRP you))
(VP (MD should)
(VP (AUX do)
(S (VP (TO to)
(VP (VP (VB remove)
(NP (JJ malicious) (NN code))
(PP (IN from)
(NP (PRP$ your) (VBN hacked) (NN site))))
(CC and)
(VP (VB prevent)
(NP (PRP it))
(PP (IN from)
(S (VP (VBG happening) (ADVP (RB again)) (PRN (-LRB- -LRB-) (CC or)
(SBAR (RB ever) (IN if)
(S (NP (PRP it))
(VP (AUX has) (RB n't)
(VP (VBN happened) (ADVP (RB yet)))
(-RRB- -RRB-)))
(. .)))
In the ICWSM 2009 Weblog Corpus:
Advanced HIPS solutions use various protection styles to provide layers of defense at endpoints, including: Protocol anomaly detection Deep – packet inspection for known network attack signatures or vulnerability attack signatures Simulation of potentially malicious code before it executes by using static analysis, code simulation or virtual machines Genetic heuristics, which is the use of broad signatures to detect variants using common malware family characteristics Comprehensive buffer overflow and program flow control protectio Advanced application control to determine which applications are allowed to execute and to restrict system resource access “Sandboxing’ ’ and other virtualization techniques to inspect and isolate potentially malicious code from causing damage to the endpoint Behavior – based analysis of executing code to determine whether it is behavingmaliciously and providing the capability to undo the damage and remove the malware.
(Parse)
(S1 (S (NP (JJ Advanced) (NNS HIPS) (NNS solutions))
(VP (VBP use)
(NP (JJ various) (NN protection) (NNS styles))
(S (VP (TO to)
(VP (VB provide)
(NP (NP (NNS layers))
(PP (IN of)
(NP (NP (NN defense))
(PP (IN at)
(NP (NP (NNS endpoints)) (, ,)
(PP (VBG including) (: :)
(NP (NP (NNP Protocol) (NN anomaly) (NN detection) (JJ Deep)) (: -)
(NP (NP (NN packet) (NN inspection))
(PP (IN for)
(NP (NP (JJ known) (NN network) (NN attack) (NNS signatures)) (CC or)
(NP (NP (NN vulnerability) (NN attack) (NNS signatures) (NN Simulation))
(PP (IN of)
(NP (ADJP (RB potentially) (JJ malicious)) (NN code)))
(SBAR (IN before)
(S (NP (PRP it))
(VP (VBZ executes)
(PP (IN by)
(S (VP (VBG using)
(NP (NP (JJ static) (NN analysis)) (, ,)
(NP (NN code) (NN simulation)) (CC or)
(NP (JJ virtual) (NNS machines)))
(NP (NP (JJ Genetic) (NNS heuristics)) (, ,)
(SBAR (WHNP (WDT which))
(S (VP (AUX is)
(NP (NP (DT the) (NN use))
(PP (IN of)
(NP (JJ broad) (NNS signatures)))
(S (VP (TO to)
(VP (VB detect)
(NP (NP (NNS variants))
(VP (VBG using)
(NP (NP (JJ common) (JJ malware) (NN family) (NNS characteristics))
(NP (JJ Comprehensive) (NN buffer) (NN overflow) (CC and) (NN program) (NN flow) (NN control)) (NNP protectio) (NNP Advanced) (NN application) (NN control))
(S (VP (TO to)
(VP (VB determine)
(SBAR (WHNP (WDT which))
(S (NP (NNS applications))
(VP (AUX are)
(VP (VBN allowed)
(S (VP (TO to)
(VP (VP (VB execute)) (CC and)
(VP (TO to)
(VP (VB restrict)
(NP (NN system) (NN resource) (NN access)) ('' ') ('' ')
(S (NP (NP (NNP Sandboxing) (POS ')) ('' ') (CC and)
(NP (JJ other) (NN virtualization) (NNS techniques)))
(VP (TO to)
(VP (VB inspect) (CC and) (VB isolate)
(NP (ADJP (RB potentially) (JJ malicious)) (NN code))
(PP (IN from)
(S (VP (VBG causing)
(NP (NP (NN damage))
(PP (TO to)
(NP (DT the) (JJ endpoint) (NN Behavior)))
(: -)
(NP (NP (VBN based) (NN analysis))
(PP (IN of)
(S (VP (VBG executing)
(NP (NN code))
(S (VP (TO to)
(VP (VB determine)
(SBAR (IN whether)
(S (NP (PRP it))
(VP (AUX is) (UCP (ADVP (RB behavingmaliciously)) (CC and)
(VP (VBG providing)
(NP (DT the) (NN capability)
(S (VP (TO to)
(VP (VP (VB undo)
(NP (DT the) (NN damage)))
(CC and)
(VP (VB remove)
(NP (DT the) (NN malware)))
(. .)))
In the ICWSM 2009 Weblog Corpus:
Proactively protect against known and unknown threats Behavioral Genotype? protection identifies malicious code and blocks it before execution, giving the benefits of a Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS).
(Parse)
(S1 (S (FRAG (RB Proactively)
(VP (VB protect)
(PP (IN against)
(NP (ADJP (JJ known) (CC and) (JJ unknown)) (NNS threats)))
(NP (JJ Behavioral) (NN Genotype)))
(. ?))
(NP (NN protection))
(VP (VP (VBZ identifies)
(NP (JJ malicious) (NN code)))
(CC and)
(VP (NNS blocks)
(NP (PRP it))
(PP (IN before)
(NP (NN execution)))
(, ,)
(S (VP (VBG giving)
(NP (NP (DT the) (NNS benefits))
(PP (IN of)
(NP (NP (DT a) (NNP Host) (NN Intrusion) (NNP Prevention) (NNP System)) (PRN (-LRB- -LRB-)
(NP (NNS HIPS)) (-RRB- -RRB-)))
(. .)))
And 909 more sentences.
NB: Do not link to this page – the URL for this factoid will change every time the available knowledge base is updated.