POSTER: Restricting Control Flow During Speculative Execution

Zhuojia Shen
University of Rochester
zshen10@cs.rochester.edu

Divya Ojha
University of Rochester
dojha@cs.rochester.edu

Jie Zhou
University of Rochester
jzhou41@cs.rochester.edu

John Criswell
University of Rochester
criswell@cs.rochester.edu

ABSTRACT
Speculative execution is one of the key techniques that modern processors use to boost performance. However, recent research shows that speculative execution can be used to steal sensitive data. We present a software-based solution to mitigate Spectre attacks by restricting the control flow of speculatively-executed instructions.

CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Side-channel analysis and countermeasures; Systems security;

KEYWORDS
speculative execution, side-channel defenses, Spectre attacks

ACM Reference Format:

1 INTRODUCTION
Modern high-performance processors support speculative execution and out-of-order execution. Speculative execution [11] is a technique in which the processor speculatively executes instructions prior to knowing that they are required in order to improve performance; if the processor later determines that the instructions should not have been executed, it discards the computation, rolling back all the architectural effects resulting from the speculatively-executed instructions. Out-of-order execution [11] is a performance improvement in which the processor executes instructions out of program order to maximize throughput. While these features are meant to improve processor performance, recent research (Meltdown [10] and Spectre [7]) has shown that attackers can leverage these optimizations to launch powerful side-channel attacks. Meltdown [10] exploits out-of-order execution and a security defect in which the processor performs the hardware MMU protection check late in the pipeline, using them to bypass hardware-enforced memory isolation. Spectre [7] tricks the processor into speculatively executing instructions that load a victim’s secret data into registers and then leaks the data via a cache side channel. To date, at least four new variants of Meltdown and Spectre have been discovered [4–6, 8].

While there exist compiler-based transformations that defend against Meltdown [10] and Spectre [7] (such as Spectre-resistant software fault isolation (SFI) [2]), they typically cannot mitigate Branch Target Injection (i.e., Spectre Variant 2 [7]) which mistrains the processor’s Branch Target Buffer (BTB) to hijack speculative control flow. To mistrain, or poison, the BTB, the attacker program repeatedly executes a set of branches that jump to a target address [7]. Since the BTB is shared, branches in the victim will reuse these BTB entries that were trained by the attacker. This causes the processor to mistakenly jump to the desired address while executing victim code, causing it to speculatively execute code of the attacker’s choosing. Since there is no way for existing software defenses to prevent BTB poisoning, they cannot prevent such attacks. Worse yet, the retpoline defense [12] does not work as it is susceptible to a new Spectre variant called Spectre-RSB [8] that manipulates the processor’s Return Stack Buffer (RSB). Spectre-RSB works similarly to BTB poisoning except that it poisons the RSB to influence the target prediction of return instructions.

In this paper, we present Venkman, a novel software-based solution to enhance existing software defenses against Spectre. Venkman employs compiler techniques to create bundles of instructions that are equally power-of-two sized and aligned. By bit-masking all indirect branch targets at run-time, Venkman restricts all branches to jump to the beginning of bundles. By transforming all code on the system with Venkman, all BTB entries can only be trained to jump to the beginning of bundles. If all instructions to mitigate Spectre attacks are contained within a bundle, training of the BTB will not be able to jump into the middle of a bundle to avoid executing them. For processors that use dedicated return instructions, Venkman transforms returns to indirect jumps so that they use the BTB instead of the RSB for prediction. Bundle alignment and branch target restrictions are the key to ensuring that existing defenses are not bypassed: with Venkman, existing compiler-based Spectre defenses such as load fences [5] and Spectre-resistant SFI [2] on loads are always guaranteed to be executed on any program path taken during speculative execution. Venkman also utilizes Spectre-resistant SFI [2] on stores to protect the program’s code segment from a new Meltdown variant [6] that breaks read-only memory protection. Our defenses are self-protecting: bundle alignment and branch target restrictions prevent SFI on stores from being speculatively
bypassed, while SFI on stores ensures that the code segment is not modified during speculative execution.

Venkman instruments programs to resist Spectre. However, the instrumentation must be performed on every program in the system in order to take effect: one single uninstrumented program can mis-train the BTB to attack instrumented programs. Several solutions exist for ensuring that all code is transformed by Venkman. One is to use a system like Secure Virtual Architecture (SVA) [1] which forces all code to be shipped as virtual instruction set code; the SVA virtual machine will translate the code to native code before execution, transforming it with Venkman during code generation. Alternatively, the operating system and dynamic loader can use a binary code verifier like that in Google’s Native Client (NaCl) [13] to verify that all programs it loads into memory for execution have been previously transformed with Venkman (the operating system kernel must be transformed with Venkman as well). If a program is found to be non-compliant with Venkman’s restrictions, the operating system kernel can refuse to load the code for execution.

2 DESIGN

Venkman consists of two defenses: one combining bundle alignment and branch target restrictions that constrain the addresses to which branches can jump, and the other leveraging Spectre-resistant SFI [2] on memory writes to prevent speculative writes to the code segment. We show that our first defense mitigates mis-training of the processor’s BTB, and our second defense defeats Read-only Protection Bypass attacks on the code segment [6].

2.1 Restricting Branch Targets to Bundles

Bundle Alignment. A bundle is a sequence of instructions that has a fixed power-of-two size and alignment in which the size and alignment are the same value. Venkman ensures that the target of all branches is at the beginning of a bundle. In this way, Venkman ensures that all the instructions inside a bundle are executed as a whole in the control flow. This requirement also implies that branches such as function calls must be at the end of a bundle so that their return addresses are aligned at the beginning of the next bundle. This is similar to NaCl’s control flow policy [13] that prevents jumps around required compiler instrumentation.

In order to make Spectre-resistant SFI on stores efficient, Venkman must ensure that all code resides in one portion of the virtual address space and the heap, stack, globals, and memory mapped files occupy a separate region of the virtual address space. If the different regions for code and data are chosen carefully, a simple bit-masking operation with a constant value suffices to ensure that store instructions write to the region of the virtual address space that contains program data.

Venkman instruments each store with a bit-masking instruction to ensure that the target address of the store is outside the code segment. Additionally, Venkman ensures that the store and the bit-masking instruction before it are always in the same bundle. If all code on a system is transformed in this way, and if all code segments reside in the same region of the virtual address space in all processes, then these restrictions on control flow prevent mistraining of the BTB with arbitrary addresses: only the starting address of a bundle can go into the BTB. Additionally, Venkman converts all return instructions into indirect branches. If such instructions use the RSB, it ensures that all addresses in the RSB reside on a bundle boundary (since all call instructions occur at the end of a bundle). If the conversion causes the branch to use the BTB instead of the RSB, then it still ensures that all targets are bundle addresses.

2.2 Speculative Code Segment Integrity

Not only can speculative execution leak secret data, but it can also corrupt memory locations temporarily during speculative execution via speculative memory writes [6]. Even if the operating system configures the code segment to be non-writeable, speculative corruption of the code segment may still be possible if the processor checks page permissions too late in the processor pipeline [6] and the result of the speculative write is forwarded to the instruction fetch unit for subsequent reads. To solve this problem, we use Spectre-resistant SFI [2] on store instructions to ensure that they do not speculatively write to the code segment. Spectre-resistant SFI works by creating a data dependence between the bit-masking SFI code and the subsequent memory access so that the memory access are stalled until the SFI code completes execution [2]. By using Spectre-resistant SFI on stores, Venkman ensures that the target address of stores are outside the code segment before the store begins to write memory speculatively.
3 IMPLEMENTATION

We built an initial prototype of Venkman for the 64-bit POWER8 architecture [3] using the LLVM compiler [9]. We chose POWER8 because it uses fixed-length instructions, making it easier to write code that creates aligned bundles of instructions. Currently, only our code alignment and branch instrumentation is implemented.

We built Venkman as two MachineFunctionPass components added to the LLVM 4.0 compiler. The first pass searches for instructions that move values into the link register and counter register; all indirect branches on POWER8 use these two registers to hold the target of the branch [3]. In the case of the counter register, Venkman searches forward in the basic block to see if the counter register is used as an indirect branch target or if it is read by another instruction. In the former case, the value moved into the counter target is the target of a branch; in the latter case, it is a non-target value and is not modified. For values moved into the link register and target addresses moved into the counter register, Venkman adds two instructions that clear the lowest 4 bits (so that the target address is aligned on a 16-byte bundle boundary) and clears the highest 33 bits (to force the target to be a code segment address; Venkman will eventually force all code to be loaded into the lower 2 GB of the virtual address space).

The second MachineFunctionPass transforms each basic block to be a bundle of instructions that is 16 bytes long and aligned on a 16-byte boundary. It breaks larger basic blocks up into smaller basic blocks and adds NOP instructions to smaller basic blocks to make them equal to 16 bytes. During this process, Venkman ensures that instructions that must belong to the same bundle are co-located in the same basic block. For example, the bit-masking instructions on values moved to the link or counter register are always located in the same basic block as the branch using the target address value. Venkman also ensures that all call instructions appear at the end of a basic block; this ensures that the return address saved in the link register is the address of the next contiguous bundle in memory.

4 PRELIMINARY RESULTS

To evaluate Venkman’s performance, we compiled the SPEC CPU 2017 benchmarks without Venkman (as the baseline) and with Venkman. We used a 64-bit 20-core IBM POWER8 machine running at 4.1 GHz. The machine has 64 GB of RAM and runs Linux 3.10.0.

Table 1 shows the baseline performance using the train inputs, and the overhead induced by Venkman normalized to the baseline. As Table 1 shows, the alignment and bit-masking of control data imposed by Venkman induces 0% to 23% overhead with an average of 5.9%.

5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

This paper presents a software-based solution that mitigates BTB poisoning by ensuring that all software trains BTB entries to jump to aligned addresses within the code segment, thereby preventing malicious branches to arbitrary instructions. By deploying SFI on all store instructions, we can ensure that the processor never corrupts the code segment during speculative execution.

In future work, we will complete the Venkman prototype and incorporate our work into existing defenses such as Spectre-resistant SFI [2], providing a complete SFI solution that resists Spectre attacks. We will also measure the memory overhead induced by Venkman.

REFERENCES


