

Network Security in Practice

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Recap: Principles of Network Security

Cryptography:

- symmetric keys: weakness? protocols?
- public keys: weakness? protocols?

Confidentiality:

- only sender, intended receiver should "understand" message contents

Authentication:

- sender, receiver want to confirm identity of each other

Message Integrity:

- sender, receiver want to ensure message not altered (in transit, or afterwards)

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Outline

- Key distribution and certification
- Access control: firewalls
- Attacks and counter measures
- Security protocol case studies

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Key Distribution and Certification

Symmetric key problem:

- How do Alice and Bob establish shared secret key over network without Trudy's knowledge?

Public key problem:

- When Alice obtains Bob's public key (from web site, e-mail, diskette), how does she know it is Bob's public key, not Trudy's?


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Secret Key Distribution: Key Distribution Center (KDC)

- **KDC:** server shares different secret key with *each* registered user (many users).
- Alice, Bob know own symmetric keys, K_{A-KDC} K_{B-KDC} , for communicating with KDC.




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Key Distribution using KDC

Q: How does KDC allow Bob, Alice to determine shared symmetric secret key to communicate with each other?




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Public Key Distribution: Certification Authorities

- **Certification authority (CA):** trustable by everyone; every one knows its public key.
- E (person, router) registers its public key with CA.
 - E provides "proof of identity" to CA.
 - CA creates certificate binding E to its public key.
 - certificate containing E's public key digitally signed by CA - CA says "this is E's public key"



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
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Certification Authorities (cont.)

When Alice wants to verify Bob's public key:

- gets Bob's certificate (Bob or elsewhere).
- apply CA's public key to Bob's certificate, verify Bob's public key.



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Outline

- Key distribution and certification
 - key distribution center for distributing secret symmetric keys
 - certification authority for distributing certified public keys
- **Access control: firewalls**
- Attacks and counter measures
- Security protocol case studies


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Access Control: Firewalls

firewall
isolates organization's internal network from the public Internet through filtering, allowing some data to pass, blocking others.




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Network-layer Packet Filtering



- firewall is built into the **edge router** connected to the Internet
- router **filters packet-by-packet**, decision to forward/drop packet based on:
 - source IP address, destination IP address
 - TCP/UDP source and destination port numbers
 - TCP SYN and ACK bits

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Policies in Network-layer Packet Filtering

- **Example 1:** blocking all incoming TCP datagrams with dest port = 80
 - No external clients can access internal Web servers.
- **Example 2:** blocking all TCP datagrams with source or dest port = 23, except for those with source or dest IP = 128.151.67.155 (a particular internal machine)
 - All incoming and outgoing telnet connections have to go through a telnet gateway.
- **Example 3:** blocking all incoming TCP datagrams with ACK bit set to 0
 - Prevents external clients from initiating TCP connections with internal clients, but allows internal clients to connect to outside.

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More on Network-layer Packet Filtering

- Advantage:
 - transparent to network applications
 - incurring little extra overhead/latency
- Limitation:
 - relying only on IP/TCP/UDP header info
 - ⇒ not flexible enough
 - ⇒ e.g., firewall can know the IP of the source, but not the "user"


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Application-layer Gateways

- Access control according to application-layer information.
- **Example:** allow selected internal users to telnet outside.



1. Router filter blocks all telnet connections not originating from gateway ⇒ require all telnet users to telnet through gateway.
2. For authorized users, gateway sets up telnet connection to dest host.

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Outline

- Key distribution and certification
- Access control: firewalls
 - network-layer firewall
 - application-layer firewall
- **Attacks and countermeasures**
- Security protocol case studies

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Network Security Threat: Mapping

Mapping:

- before attacking: "scout the area" - find out what services are implemented on network
- Use ping to determine what host addresses are valid on the network
- Port-scanning: try to establish TCP connection to each port in sequence (see what happens)

Countermeasures at the firewall:

- record traffic entering network
- look for suspicious activity (e.g., IP addresses, ports being scanned sequentially)

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
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Network Security Threat: Packet Sniffing

Packet sniffing:

- promiscuous NIC reads all packets passing by a broadcast media (e.g. shared-link Ethernet)
- can read all unencrypted data (e.g. passwords)



Countermeasures:

- checks periodically if host interface in promiscuous mode.
- one host per segment of broadcast media (switched Ethernet)
- encrypt all packets.

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Network Security Threat: IP Spoofing

IP Spoofing:

- with root privilege, one can generate "raw" IP packets with any value into IP source address field
- receiver can't tell if source is spoofed
- e.g.: T pretends to be B



Countermeasures:

- authentication
- ingress filtering - routers should not forward outgoing packets with invalid source addresses

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
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Network Security Threat: Denial-of-service Attack

Denial of service (DOS):

- SYN flooding: attacker establishes many bogus TCP connections, flood of maliciously generated packets "swamp" receiver
- Distributed DOS (DDOS): multiple coordinated sources swamp receiver
- e.g., T and remote host SYN-attack A




Countermeasures?

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Countermeasures for DOS Attacks



Countermeasures:

- filter out flooded packets (e.g., SYN): throw out good and bad connections
- trace back to source of floods
 - attack packets with spoofed IPs
 - sources are most likely an innocent, compromised machines
- delayed processing/resource allocation

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Outline

- Key distribution and certification
- Access control: firewalls
- Attacks and counter measures
 - mapping, sniffing, spoofing, DOS attack
- Security protocol case studies
 - Application-layer PGP: **secure email**
 - Transport-layer SSL: **secure sockets**
 - Network-layer IPsec: **secure networking**


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Secure Email: Confidentiality

Alice wants to send confidential e-mail, m , to Bob.



Alice:

- generates random *symmetric* private key, K_S .
- encrypts message with K_S .
- encrypts K_S with Bob's public key.
- sends both $K_S(m)$ and $K_B(K_S)$ to Bob.

Bob:

- uses his private key to decrypt and recover K_S
- uses K_S to decrypt $K_S(m)$ to recover m

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Secure Email: Sender Authentication and Message Integrity

- How to provide sender authentication and message integrity?
 - generating a digital signature of the message digest using its private key
- Put everything together
 - using one-time session key and the receiver's public key to encrypt a digitally signed message.
 - support confidentiality, sender authentication, and message integrity.
 - PGP (pretty good privacy) for Internet email.

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Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)

- **SSL:** transport layer security service to any TCP-based applications
 - used between Web browsers, servers for e-commerce (https).
 - used between IMAP clients and servers.
- **security services:**
 - **data encryption**
 - Browser generates **symmetric session key**, encrypts it with server's public key, sends encrypted key to server.
 - Using its own private key, server decrypts session key.
 - All data sent into TCP socket (by client or server) encrypted with session key.

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Network Layer Security Protocol IPsec

- Like before:
 - data confidentiality by encryption using a symmetric session key
 - source authentication & data integrity by signed message digests



- Done in a way that is compatible with basic IP routing functions
 - easy deployment - require no router changes

Network Security (summary)

Basic techniques.....

- cryptography (symmetric and public)
- authentication
- message integrity
- key distribution

.... network security in practice

- firewall
- attacks and countermeasures
- secure application (PGP for email)
- secure transport (SSL)
- secure network (IPsec)

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