

More on Network Security

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Outline

- Key distribution and certification
- Access control: firewalls
- Attacks and counter measures
 - mapping
 - sniffing
 - spoofing
 - DOS attack
- Security protocol case studies

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
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Network Security Threat: Denial-of-service Attack

Denial of service (DOS):

- SYN flooding: attacker establishes many bogus TCP connections, flood of maliciously generated packets "swamp" receiver
- Distributed DOS (DDOS): multiple coordinated sources swamp receiver
- e.g., T and remote host SYN-attack A




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Countermeasure 1: packet filtering




- attack packets carry spoofed IP addresses - hard to filter based on IP address
- if filtering out all SYN packets, then no good connections
- if filtering out some SYN packets, throw out good and bad connections

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Countermeasure 2: Trace Back



Trace back to flood source:

- attack packets with spoofed IPs
- trace back through network statistics
- sources are most likely an innocent, compromised machines

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
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Countermeasure 3: delayed processing

Delayed processing or resource allocation:

- what is the main resource needs triggered by TCP connection?
- data structure allocation and initialization at receipt of real data request, not at receipt of first SYN



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Stateless TCP

Stateless TCP [Shieh et al. NSDI 2005]:

- server side maintains no state about TCP connections.
- **advantage:** TCP connections only require temporary space during packet processing
- state for a traditional TCP connection:
 - send window buffer
 - various control parameters and network statistics
- how to avoid maintaining such state at server side?
- also useful for transparent server fail-over/migration

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Outline

- Key distribution and certification
- Access control: firewalls
- Attacks and counter measures
 - mapping, sniffing, spoofing, DOS attack
- **Security protocol case studies**
 - Application-layer PGP: **secure email**
 - Transport-layer SSL: **secure sockets**
 - Network-layer IPsec: **secure networking**


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Secure Email: Confidentiality

- Alice wants to send confidential e-mail, m , to Bob.



Alice:

- generates random *symmetric* private key, K_S .
- encrypts message with K_S .
- encrypts K_S with Bob's public key.
- sends both $K_S(m)$ and $K_B^+(K_S)$ to Bob.

Bob:

- uses his private key to decrypt and recover K_S
- uses K_S to decrypt $K_S(m)$ to recover m

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Secure Email: Sender Authentication and Message Integrity

- How to provide sender authentication and message integrity?
 - generating a digital signature of the message digest using its private key
- Put everything together
 - using one-time session key and the receiver's public key to encrypt a digitally signed message.
 - support confidentiality, sender authentication, and message integrity.
 - PGP (pretty good privacy) for Internet email.

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Web of Trust: distribution of public keys

- Public key distribution:
 - Certification authority
- Web of trust:
 - If A knows B personally, they can exchange public keys using offline means;
 - If A knows B's public key and trusts B, then A may also take C's public key certificate signed by B.

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Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)

- **SSL**: transport layer security service to any TCP-based applications
 - used between Web browsers, servers for e-commerce (https).
 - used between IMAP clients and servers.
- Security services, like before:
 - data confidentiality by encryption using a symmetric session key, key encrypted with server's public key.
 - source authentication & data integrity by signed message digests
 - an issue: message signing granularity

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Network Layer Security Protocol IPsec

- Like before:
 - data confidentiality by encryption using a symmetric session key
 - source authentication & data integrity by signed message digests



- Done in a way that is compatible with basic IP routing functions
 - easy deployment - require no router changes

Network Security (summary)

Basic techniques.....

- cryptography (symmetric and public)
- authentication
- message integrity
- key distribution

.... network security in practice

- firewall
- attacks and countermeasures
- secure application (PGP for email)
- secure transport (SSL)
- secure network (IPsec)

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