

Security

CS 256/456
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Security vs. Protection

- Protection
 - Mechanism to control (restrict/provide) access to resources by programs, processes, or users
 - A means to specify the control policy
- Security
 - Authentication of system users to ensure legitimacy
 - Prevent malicious or accidental unauthorized destruction or alteration of data, introduction of inconsistency

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The Security Environment

Security goals:

- Authentication
- Data confidentiality
- Data integrity
- System availability

Threats of intruders or adversaries:

- Identity hijacking
- Exposing data
- Tampering with data
- Denial of service attacks

We focus on OS-related security issues

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Login Spoofing

- Login spoofing
 - A program running by the attacker displays a login screen (like the real one)
 - After a legitimate user types in username and password, it records those, kills itself, and a real login screen is shown
 - The user thinks she typed in a wrong password and tries again, which works
- Countermeasure?
 - Start each login session with a non-user-catchable key combination "Ctrl-Alt-Delete"

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Leaking Unnecessary Information

LOGIN: ken
PASSWORD: FooBar
SUCCESSFUL LOGIN

(a)

LOGIN: carol
INVALID LOGIN NAME
LOGIN:

(b)

LOGIN: carol
PASSWORD: ldunno
INVALID LOGIN
LOGIN:
(c)

User authentication:

- (a) A successful login
- (b) Login rejected after name entered
- (c) Login rejected after name and password typed

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Cryptography as a Security Tool

- Encryption – constrain set of possible receivers
 - Symmetric (secret key) vs. asymmetric (public key)
- Authentication – constrain set of possible senders
 - Hash or message digest (one-way function, secret key) vs. digital signature (public key)
- Key distribution

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User Authentication

- UNIX user passwords are mapped using a one-way function "e()"; and then stored in a globally readable file "/etc/passwd"
 - Bobbie, e(Dog)
 - Tony, e(6%%TaeFF)
 -
- Attack:
 - used a precomputed common password list
- Countermeasure?
 - salt
 - Bobbie, 4238, e(Dog4238)
 - Tony, 2918, e(6%%TaeFF2918)

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Improving Password Security

- One-time passwords
 - Challenge-response authentication
- Authentication using a physical object (e.g., ATM card)
- Authentication using biometrics


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The TENEX Password Problem

- Files are accessed with passwords. At each access, the password is checked byte-by-byte and an error is returned as soon as a byte is mismatched.




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Buffer Overflow



- (a) Situation when main program is running
- (b) After program A called
- (c) Buffer overflow shown in gray

Countermeasures:

- boundary checks, non-executable stack/data segment, ...

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Information Leaking Through Side Channels

- Side channels
 - performance observations
 - program execution signals (e.g., cache usage, memory bus usage)
- Side channel attack on hyper-threading processors [Percival 2005]
 - OpenSSH running DES encryption on one hyper-thread
 - attacker running on the other hyper-thread
 - attacker and OpenSSH share hardware cache, so attacker can monitor its own cache miss pattern to infer the execution of OpenSSH (and its DES encryption key)

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Denial-of-Service Attack

- Attacker attempts to consume all available resources at the host so no resources are left to serve legitimate users
 - attacks often come from network and they are distributed
- TCP flooding:
 - attackers establish many bogus TCP connections
 - host allocates buffer space for each connection
 - host memory being exhausted eventually
- Countermeasure?
 - discard flooded requests: throw out good and bad ones
 - trace back to source of floods
 - attack requests with spoofed identities
 - sources are most likely an innocent, compromised machines
 - delayed processing/resource allocation

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Viruses and Worms

- Virus
 - fragment of code embedded in a legitimate program
 - Designed to self-replicate/infect other programs
- Worms
 - A process that uses the spawn mechanism to use system resources
 - Can reproduce themselves across networks to shut down systems

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The Morris Worm [1988]

- Three methods of infection
 - rsh from trusted machine
 - Buffer overflow attack in finger
 - Bug in sendmail
- Once a machine was infected, used password cracking for further proliferation
- If a copy of the worm already existed, 1 in 7 exited
 - Downfall since it brought the Internet down

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Virus


- Virus (fragment of code embedded in a legitimate program)
 - program can reproduce itself
 - e.g., when invoked, traverse the file system and attach it to randomly selected executables
 - additionally, do harm
 - steal your data
 - temporarily crash the system
 - permanently damage data or hardware
 - denial of service by using all available system resources
- "Good" virus
 - quickly spreading virus
 - difficult to detect

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Infecting An Executable (Trojan Horses)



- (a) An executable program
 (b) With a virus at the front
 (c) With the virus at the end
 (d) With a virus spread over free space within program


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Memory Resident Viruses

- Virus resides in memory; intercepting system calls
- Where in memory to put the virus?
 - known unused memory in OS kernel
 - make the OS believe the memory that virus uses is "legitimately used"
- How to load virus there in the first place?
 - boot sector viruses
 - device driver viruses




How Viruses Spread

- Try to infect programs on
 - networks: exploiting buffer overflow errors in network server daemons
 - floppy drives
- Attach to innocent looking email
 - when it runs, use mailing list to replicate

Antivirus Techniques

- Size checkers
 - keep a record on the size of disk files and scan them periodically for any size changes
 - apply on readonly executables.
- Signature scanning
 - maintain a database of patterns of common viruses
 - scan disk files for these patterns

Anti-Antivirus Techniques



- (a) A program
- (b) Infected program
- (c) Compressed infected program
- (d) Encrypted virus
- (e) Compressed virus with encrypted compression code

More Antivirus Techniques

- Integrity checkers
 - similar to size checkers, but this time we compute a checksum for file and store them somewhere; we periodically check all files to see whether the checksum still matches
- Behavioral checkers (memory-resident anti-virus program)
 - intercept system calls and detect suspicious activities: overwriting executables, ...

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